Four years ago (June 2010), I was pointing out how Agorocracy vs. Democracy were fighting it out in EUrope and the world. How the financial system had gone out of bounds compared to other aspects of our lives. Since then, 44 months have passed. The speaker has slimmed down (see video) and so have the budgets of Greece, Spain and other troubled Euro member states.
Cyprus banks got a haircut last year.
But what is the state of the competition between Agorocracy and Democracy today, February 2014?
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Sunday, February 16, 2014
Saturday, December 8, 2012
Mittelstand
Along with the advantages and management/business/policy techniques of complex goods manufacturing ..
Is German Mittelstand under-studied by US, European and international business gurus?
Is German Mittelstand under-studied by US, European and international business gurus?
Thursday, December 6, 2012
Merkelian logics
Merkel's Euro policies qualify for a saying: It's all German to me (compare with the origin of the original saying).
In other words, "Europe" is not "speaking" German, as Volker Kauder of the CDU hoped/argued/boasted at a CDU conference one year ago.
Note: He meant German (CDU) policies not German per se.
Btw, Merkel today said that she does not rule out another CDU-SPD coalition after next year's elections. With FDP doing the way it is, of course not.
In other words, "Europe" is not "speaking" German, as Volker Kauder of the CDU hoped/argued/boasted at a CDU conference one year ago.
Note: He meant German (CDU) policies not German per se.
Btw, Merkel today said that she does not rule out another CDU-SPD coalition after next year's elections. With FDP doing the way it is, of course not.
Thursday, November 29, 2012
Dynamics (Europe): Only Greece is Greece!
In the aftermath of Monday night's Eurogroup decision on Greece (a very complicated package/deal the elements of which and their between the lines not clear to the writer, still, 24++ hrs later, but my MBA does help, to a certain extent, to begin to try to understand this complex financial deal), some in Ireland (and I am sure in Portugal too) are wondering "what does Greece have" that they do not have (implicit in that is the working assumption that the deal Greece got was, after all is said (and analysed) a good one).
Well, for one, with all due respect, Greece did not have politicians arguing that their country is NOT Greece. That is if I recall well the case for Ireland and Portugal, at least. I only call it as I remember it, vividly with we "are not Greece" political chants of sorts still in my ears from many many months ago).
Yes, Ireland does not have sunshine. I love Ireland and I wish it did. Not a fan of humidity. Greece never had or claimed to have a Tiger, either. Nor does it benefit from a corporate tax regime that via transfer pricing seems to suck corporate taxable income from other national tax systems, in the EU, Eurozone and beyond (in a very "our taxpayers" age, eg in Germany, The Netherlands, Finland, UK even USA - see other blog posts for the folly of that "out taxpayers" argument though, at least inside the EU and Eurozone).
What Ireland and Portugal do not have, either, is a huge pile of mud that has been thrown at them in the last three years, in the form of "lazy" and other epithets.
It was almost clear to most from the start that the first deal Greece got ("Memorandum 1") was meant to be punitive and, what is more, discourage Ireland, Portugal and other Euro members from ever asking for one.
It also seems clear to at least some commentators of the Eurogroup decision that Greece got a good enough deal considering the potential events re Spain, Italy, increasingly (?), France. And the German political timing/scene (elections next autumn). One that may be revised when the time (in Euro and German politics) is "right". At least that is one way to look at things. There are others.
Well, for one, with all due respect, Greece did not have politicians arguing that their country is NOT Greece. That is if I recall well the case for Ireland and Portugal, at least. I only call it as I remember it, vividly with we "are not Greece" political chants of sorts still in my ears from many many months ago).
Yes, Ireland does not have sunshine. I love Ireland and I wish it did. Not a fan of humidity. Greece never had or claimed to have a Tiger, either. Nor does it benefit from a corporate tax regime that via transfer pricing seems to suck corporate taxable income from other national tax systems, in the EU, Eurozone and beyond (in a very "our taxpayers" age, eg in Germany, The Netherlands, Finland, UK even USA - see other blog posts for the folly of that "out taxpayers" argument though, at least inside the EU and Eurozone).
What Ireland and Portugal do not have, either, is a huge pile of mud that has been thrown at them in the last three years, in the form of "lazy" and other epithets.
It was almost clear to most from the start that the first deal Greece got ("Memorandum 1") was meant to be punitive and, what is more, discourage Ireland, Portugal and other Euro members from ever asking for one.
It also seems clear to at least some commentators of the Eurogroup decision that Greece got a good enough deal considering the potential events re Spain, Italy, increasingly (?), France. And the German political timing/scene (elections next autumn). One that may be revised when the time (in Euro and German politics) is "right". At least that is one way to look at things. There are others.
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
Systemics and Dynamics Live NP Blog, October 31, 2012
Read bottom up to follow the flow:
Evening:
Euro crisis/Troika:
I thought memorandums were supposed to be brief, not as brief as executive summaries, but brief.
There seem to be 2 divergent views re the effect of Sandy on US economy: a) disruption of the recovery b) growth stimulus effect by money spend on the damages, multiplied by a greater than 1.0 factor. As per electoral effects, some think it may prove beneficial for Obama and Dems if seems presidential in his dealing with Sandy effects is deemed effective. Or could backfire. Will it also restore some faith of people in "government" and make collective esprit (eg health care) more popular. Guess we shall see.
Early morning:
EU/Euro/econ/fin crises:
Many admire the Iceland "model" of dealing with it. But they should recall it has a population of 320,000, a total area of 103,000 km2 out there in the Atlantic and a volcano!
More philosophical:
The problem with parents raising their kids with prince/princess aka noble values is that unless they also give them a Principauté, they are in for a rough ride in the "streets" of life.
Philosophical:
Hard times for "princes" and "princesses" (not the real ones, the other ones). Also hard for vagabonds, though. Unless in warmer climates.
Jobs/Career:
For decades now, searching for a job had become a job. In recent years, it has become a career.
Evening:
Euro crisis/Troika:
I thought memorandums were supposed to be brief, not as brief as executive summaries, but brief.
There seem to be 2 divergent views re the effect of Sandy on US economy: a) disruption of the recovery b) growth stimulus effect by money spend on the damages, multiplied by a greater than 1.0 factor. As per electoral effects, some think it may prove beneficial for Obama and Dems if seems presidential in his dealing with Sandy effects is deemed effective. Or could backfire. Will it also restore some faith of people in "government" and make collective esprit (eg health care) more popular. Guess we shall see.
Early morning:
EU/Euro/econ/fin crises:
Many admire the Iceland "model" of dealing with it. But they should recall it has a population of 320,000, a total area of 103,000 km2 out there in the Atlantic and a volcano!
More philosophical:
The problem with parents raising their kids with prince/princess aka noble values is that unless they also give them a Principauté, they are in for a rough ride in the "streets" of life.
Philosophical:
Hard times for "princes" and "princesses" (not the real ones, the other ones). Also hard for vagabonds, though. Unless in warmer climates.
Jobs/Career:
For decades now, searching for a job had become a job. In recent years, it has become a career.
Wednesday, October 24, 2012
On the British EU debate (and on Germany)
In the Telegraph today, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard writes that: "Britain has left the European Union in all but name". Worth a good read.
Here is my take on the subject:
1) Are these self-fulfilling prophecies promoted as fact? But if it happens, it's a great opportunity for a continental EU member to become an English speaking hub of Europe.
2) But is the UK indeed on its way out of the EU? The UK's main philosophical objection to the EU is: Too many laws = no laws. But is the UK that different? The UK's real main problem imo it that it is (still) used to making its own rules/laws and applying them on others too. A trait Germany has picked up, too, in recent years. Both suffer imo from lack of confidence in using logic and western world style syllogistical argumentation to convince others re their POV (point of view).
That absence of syllogistical/argumentation style is imo reflected in the comments by some with respect to the style and content not only of the UK EU debate but also the Scottish UK debate.
3) Imo, British voters need to be asked if the EU27 is a place they feel part of (in many ways) or not.
If they would rather work/live/do business etc in/with the USA, Canada, Australia+NZ instead of Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Amsterdam, etc, then imo, the,UK should leave the EU. It is in effect a psychological, philosophical and strategic question, not a matter of static numbers, eg how many Brits live in the rest of the EU or how many non-British EU citizens live and work in the UK. That line of thinking misses imo the dynamic issue and the essence of the debate.
Here is my take on the subject:
1) Are these self-fulfilling prophecies promoted as fact? But if it happens, it's a great opportunity for a continental EU member to become an English speaking hub of Europe.
2) But is the UK indeed on its way out of the EU? The UK's main philosophical objection to the EU is: Too many laws = no laws. But is the UK that different? The UK's real main problem imo it that it is (still) used to making its own rules/laws and applying them on others too. A trait Germany has picked up, too, in recent years. Both suffer imo from lack of confidence in using logic and western world style syllogistical argumentation to convince others re their POV (point of view).
That absence of syllogistical/argumentation style is imo reflected in the comments by some with respect to the style and content not only of the UK EU debate but also the Scottish UK debate.
3) Imo, British voters need to be asked if the EU27 is a place they feel part of (in many ways) or not.
If they would rather work/live/do business etc in/with the USA, Canada, Australia+NZ instead of Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Amsterdam, etc, then imo, the,UK should leave the EU. It is in effect a psychological, philosophical and strategic question, not a matter of static numbers, eg how many Brits live in the rest of the EU or how many non-British EU citizens live and work in the UK. That line of thinking misses imo the dynamic issue and the essence of the debate.
Tuesday, October 16, 2012
European myths and real fears: Time to face the truth
Applying logic consistently can lead to some very hardcore argumentation in European Affairs. Especially when coupled with humanism.
Here we go (based on thoughts originally posted via my Twitter account, today):
Xenophobia and "paymasterism" are evidence of insecurity due to policy failures by mostly national policy-makers.
E.g. Angela Merkel and Co. blamed Greeks and other South Europeans to cover up for her own policy failures in 2005-2012. Except for very recently.
Plus, the EU has always been used by national politicians as a scapegoat for their failures but not their successes.
So who should be in more fear of losing their jobs and who should lose them? People or policy makers. Desperate policy makers produce even more desperate policies. Not to mention desperate (for ratings hence ad revenue) media.
So, for voters, focusing at national and local level is in a way a natural reaction, whereas the wise reaction is to focus at Euro, EU level and beyond.
Instead of helping the man/woman in streets feel a tad of stability via their policies, policy makers have been doing the opposite.
Note also that 2 months of somewhat positive propaganda by Merkel and friends re Greece seems (see polls in Germany) to have managed to partly counter 2+ years of negative propaganda. Is that scary or good? Or both?
That is the real state of the EU in 2012. It is time we start discussing those things, not only the agenda the mainstream traditional media and social media set.
Example:
People in NW and North Europe are panicking and blaming foreigners because, imho, they know their national exceptionalisms are a hot air result of propaganda - narratives. They are in real fear. Because they feel/know that their economies are way more un-competitive and cruel than anyone would admit. They are scared of losing their accumulated privileges and fear more than South Europeans, because they know their societies are more cruel than in South Europe.
Yes what I am proposing, after roaming around the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands (NL) in the past 5 weeks and lots of talking with people from all walks of life, observing systemics and dynamics and lots of thinking, is that the real reason Dutch, Finns, Germans, Belgians, Brits are reacting the way they are is: they are scared. Even more scared than South Europeans.
Take a good look for example at the "streets" of any UK, NL or Belgian city. People are "bowling alone" (much more than Greeks or Spaniard are "bowling alone") and they know it.
That is I propose the main way to interpret eg the local results in Antwerp.
So whereas Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy need real policies badly, the NL, Belgium, the UK, Germany, Finland need real policies even more badly. And more humanism (and that is a matter/task for society and thought/opinion leaders, not policy makers per se).
On the other hand, imo what Greeks and Spaniards should really worry about is not labour market reforms but of having lost part of their traditional humanism. Because once that is lost, no laws or rules can after all restore that. And liberalism needs humanism in order to work. Every system does, but liberalism (in the European not US sense of the term) does even more (that is of course why Romney and Ryan should not win the elections in the US, the country where the term "bowling alone" was invented).
The Greek and Spanish labour markets are already a "Kaiadas" (see Ancient Sparta) even without labour market reforms, so what worse can reforms do than admit that reality?
Plus Greeks, Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians should look at their national and local "champions" and elites and ask them: What have you done for me lately? In a way they are. In a way.
Being pro-EU doesn't mean being pro European Commission, pro EU Council, etc. It means being pro the common interests of 500,000,000. Because in the world systemics and dynamics of the epoch, mainly at continental and world level can effective solutions be formulated and implemented. But with a systems analysis approach that looks at the forest and at the trees at the same time. These are indeed testing times for policy makers.
The European media and social media should not focus on the symptoms (they do make for good copy, true) but at the diseases. I know it's hard.
Even more analysis on this complex topic and implications for policy makers, the civil society and economic operators at EU, Euro, national and local levels, is available upon request.
Here we go (based on thoughts originally posted via my Twitter account, today):
Xenophobia and "paymasterism" are evidence of insecurity due to policy failures by mostly national policy-makers.
E.g. Angela Merkel and Co. blamed Greeks and other South Europeans to cover up for her own policy failures in 2005-2012. Except for very recently.
Plus, the EU has always been used by national politicians as a scapegoat for their failures but not their successes.
So who should be in more fear of losing their jobs and who should lose them? People or policy makers. Desperate policy makers produce even more desperate policies. Not to mention desperate (for ratings hence ad revenue) media.
So, for voters, focusing at national and local level is in a way a natural reaction, whereas the wise reaction is to focus at Euro, EU level and beyond.
Instead of helping the man/woman in streets feel a tad of stability via their policies, policy makers have been doing the opposite.
Note also that 2 months of somewhat positive propaganda by Merkel and friends re Greece seems (see polls in Germany) to have managed to partly counter 2+ years of negative propaganda. Is that scary or good? Or both?
That is the real state of the EU in 2012. It is time we start discussing those things, not only the agenda the mainstream traditional media and social media set.
Example:
People in NW and North Europe are panicking and blaming foreigners because, imho, they know their national exceptionalisms are a hot air result of propaganda - narratives. They are in real fear. Because they feel/know that their economies are way more un-competitive and cruel than anyone would admit. They are scared of losing their accumulated privileges and fear more than South Europeans, because they know their societies are more cruel than in South Europe.
Yes what I am proposing, after roaming around the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands (NL) in the past 5 weeks and lots of talking with people from all walks of life, observing systemics and dynamics and lots of thinking, is that the real reason Dutch, Finns, Germans, Belgians, Brits are reacting the way they are is: they are scared. Even more scared than South Europeans.
Take a good look for example at the "streets" of any UK, NL or Belgian city. People are "bowling alone" (much more than Greeks or Spaniard are "bowling alone") and they know it.
That is I propose the main way to interpret eg the local results in Antwerp.
So whereas Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy need real policies badly, the NL, Belgium, the UK, Germany, Finland need real policies even more badly. And more humanism (and that is a matter/task for society and thought/opinion leaders, not policy makers per se).
On the other hand, imo what Greeks and Spaniards should really worry about is not labour market reforms but of having lost part of their traditional humanism. Because once that is lost, no laws or rules can after all restore that. And liberalism needs humanism in order to work. Every system does, but liberalism (in the European not US sense of the term) does even more (that is of course why Romney and Ryan should not win the elections in the US, the country where the term "bowling alone" was invented).
The Greek and Spanish labour markets are already a "Kaiadas" (see Ancient Sparta) even without labour market reforms, so what worse can reforms do than admit that reality?
Plus Greeks, Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians should look at their national and local "champions" and elites and ask them: What have you done for me lately? In a way they are. In a way.
Being pro-EU doesn't mean being pro European Commission, pro EU Council, etc. It means being pro the common interests of 500,000,000. Because in the world systemics and dynamics of the epoch, mainly at continental and world level can effective solutions be formulated and implemented. But with a systems analysis approach that looks at the forest and at the trees at the same time. These are indeed testing times for policy makers.
The European media and social media should not focus on the symptoms (they do make for good copy, true) but at the diseases. I know it's hard.
Even more analysis on this complex topic and implications for policy makers, the civil society and economic operators at EU, Euro, national and local levels, is available upon request.
More on separatist dynamics in Europe - a case inside Barcelona!
To some extent it's natural that paymasters at national (eg Flanders in Belgium) and local (eg Sarrià, part of Barcelona) level are sort of echoing the EU/Euro rationales of GER, NL and FIN. The EU's and Eurozone's bailouts' "paymasters" have opened Pandora's Box!
Example: Read from 20minutos.es the news story 'Sarrià is not Barcelona': la misiva de vecinos del barrio rico de la Ciudad Condal. By analogy, in this case, Barcelona is rhe EU/Eurozone and Sarrià, part of Barcelona, is Germany or maybe NL or Finland!
This post is a follow-up to my post Is more Europe the answer to separatist dynamics in Flanders, Catalonia, Scotland?
More analysis of this topic is available to clients and close friends.
Example: Read from 20minutos.es the news story 'Sarrià is not Barcelona': la misiva de vecinos del barrio rico de la Ciudad Condal. By analogy, in this case, Barcelona is rhe EU/Eurozone and Sarrià, part of Barcelona, is Germany or maybe NL or Finland!
This post is a follow-up to my post Is more Europe the answer to separatist dynamics in Flanders, Catalonia, Scotland?
More analysis of this topic is available to clients and close friends.
Thursday, August 16, 2012
Germany and Robert Redford in the Candidate!
Germany in the last few years reminds me of Robert Redford in The Candidate. It became the undisputed EU's leader but then asked, "And now what?"
Tuesday, August 14, 2012
Is Germany a bull in the Eurozone's China Store?
Some thoughts of mine on PressEurop's very interesting report: Berlin still selling too much (14/8/2012)
1) The FAZ comments IMO, at best, show (let's call it) "non-systemic thinking".
2) Is Germany exporting too much or importing and in general consuming too little? Too little from the Eurozone?
3) In terms of trade surplus, Germany is a bull in a China Store. Funny thing is, Germany's inflation phobia makes China another bull in the Eurozone and EU's "stores"/mkts for goods.
4) Germany saves "a lot" which means it has to find outlets for its investments. No wonder Germany had invested "a lot" in the PIIGS (while selling "a lot" to them too). The rest is not "rocket science"!
5) But the strategic/systemic question is: Is Germany too big to be part of the EU/EZ but too small to be a power on its own? And if Germany is too small to be a world power on its own, what do that say for eg UK's ambitions? France, sometimes arrogant, nevertheless knows it needs "Europe". UK and Germany (and others) act as if they do not.
6) Marketing: What exactly is Germany exporting that the Eurozone (40%), EU (60%), the world, a) cannot substitute or b) always need/want?
7) So with Germany having cornered the high quality market, China the low price one & US the new tech one, what's left for (most of) the rest?
8) Problem not only that Berlin still selling too much but its policy/philosophy not selling (in many parts of Europe/EU/Eurozone)
Thursday, July 12, 2012
If the whole of the Eurozone adopted the German manufacturing model, ...
If the whole of the Eurozone adopted the German manufacturing model, what would that do to the world price of quality manufactured goods?
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
Single Market: How single is single?
A labyrinth of federal, state and local laws make life difficult for average citizens & SMEs even in the USA.
A "single market" that works for ave people & SMEs needs single laws.
Hence a United States of Europe may not be what Europe actually needs. Maybe it's a Federal Republic of Europe? How single is the German single/internal market?
Saturday, June 2, 2012
Is there an NRW effect in the SPD?
My understanding is the NRW election was mainly a referendum on the non-austerity policy of NRW gov headed by Kraft.
And Kraft (NRW SPD) plus the Greens won big, getting some 50% of the vote vs some 35% for CDU and FDP.
But did the NRW and other state results active the anti-austerity - anti-Fiscal Compact sensitivities in federal SPD and Greens? Das is the question, for Germany, the Eurozone and the EU. And the world economy.
And Kraft (NRW SPD) plus the Greens won big, getting some 50% of the vote vs some 35% for CDU and FDP.
But did the NRW and other state results active the anti-austerity - anti-Fiscal Compact sensitivities in federal SPD and Greens? Das is the question, for Germany, the Eurozone and the EU. And the world economy.
Saturday, May 5, 2012
Europe Day 2012: May 6 instead of May 9?
Europe (EU) Day is on May 9 every year. But this year it seems that Europe (EU) day is May 6:
Why?
Because of the elections in France, Greece as well as Schleswig-Holstein; all there crucial not only for a national point of view but an EU (and Euroland) POV as well.
And if one takes account of the UK local elections, including London, of May 3, and other events of the week (see my European Calendar) then one could argue that this week Monday April 30th to May 6 is "Europe Week 2012".
PS. Of course, like other days, such a Valentine's Day, one could argue that in essence days like Europe (EU) Day are or they should be every day of the year!
PS2. Add to them the local elections in some 900 towns in Italy on Sunday and Monday.
Why?
Because of the elections in France, Greece as well as Schleswig-Holstein; all there crucial not only for a national point of view but an EU (and Euroland) POV as well.
And if one takes account of the UK local elections, including London, of May 3, and other events of the week (see my European Calendar) then one could argue that this week Monday April 30th to May 6 is "Europe Week 2012".
PS. Of course, like other days, such a Valentine's Day, one could argue that in essence days like Europe (EU) Day are or they should be every day of the year!
PS2. Add to them the local elections in some 900 towns in Italy on Sunday and Monday.
Thursday, April 26, 2012
What can European integration learn ...
1) What can European integration learn from the German Confederation (1815-66) and the German unification (1871)?
I mean both positive and negative lessons.
2) What can "united Europe" learn from the United Kingdom (1801-present)?
I mean both positive and negative lessons.
2) What can "united Europe" learn from the United Kingdom (1801-present)?
Monday, April 23, 2012
The morning after April 22: EU27 politics: If, then, else!
Monday morning, after the first round of the French Presidential elections.
Does Le Pen showing decrease the probability of Hollande success in Round 2, on May 6? The polls I have read seem to suggest yes, but only by a little. But let's try an if, then, else exercise.
If Hollande wins the Presidency, then he will dispute the Fiscal Compact and the German social democrats (SPD), will have political impetus to decide whether to defeat the ratification of the Fiscal Compact by Germany (since 2/3rds are needed in both houses of the German federal parliament).
If Hollande loses on May 6, Sarkozy is re-elected, then the Merkozy pair remains (almost, see eg Sarkozy's pre-election views on immigration as opposed to the German - Merkel's stance on the subject) and it is strictly up to the SPD, still trailing the CDU/CSU in the polls, to decide whether to bring down the Fiscal Compact and face the positive and negative effects of such decision in the German political arena and public opinion, else negotiate some growth spending in return for voting for the Fiscal Compact.
Is the Dutch situation, the inability of austerity and Fiscal Compact most "hardcore" supporter next to Merkozy, the current Dutch government, to meet fiscal objectives this year and next, an ace in the hands of the German SPD or the socio-political forces in the EU that are against the super austerity of the Fiscal Compact? Could be, especially if there is a new election that yields a new government that includes the Dutch Labour party (and D66).
EU27 politics are complicated, huh? Imagine if the EU had 50 states as the US does. But the US has political union, the EU?
Does Le Pen showing decrease the probability of Hollande success in Round 2, on May 6? The polls I have read seem to suggest yes, but only by a little. But let's try an if, then, else exercise.
If Hollande wins the Presidency, then he will dispute the Fiscal Compact and the German social democrats (SPD), will have political impetus to decide whether to defeat the ratification of the Fiscal Compact by Germany (since 2/3rds are needed in both houses of the German federal parliament).
If Hollande loses on May 6, Sarkozy is re-elected, then the Merkozy pair remains (almost, see eg Sarkozy's pre-election views on immigration as opposed to the German - Merkel's stance on the subject) and it is strictly up to the SPD, still trailing the CDU/CSU in the polls, to decide whether to bring down the Fiscal Compact and face the positive and negative effects of such decision in the German political arena and public opinion, else negotiate some growth spending in return for voting for the Fiscal Compact.
Is the Dutch situation, the inability of austerity and Fiscal Compact most "hardcore" supporter next to Merkozy, the current Dutch government, to meet fiscal objectives this year and next, an ace in the hands of the German SPD or the socio-political forces in the EU that are against the super austerity of the Fiscal Compact? Could be, especially if there is a new election that yields a new government that includes the Dutch Labour party (and D66).
EU27 politics are complicated, huh? Imagine if the EU had 50 states as the US does. But the US has political union, the EU?
Saturday, April 21, 2012
Is the UK the "Austria" of European unification (in 1871 analogy)?
Is the UK potentially the "Austria" of European unification (in 1871 analogy)?
By European unification I mean not the current state of the EU but the potential political union, that would count of a unification analogous (to be compared AND contrasted) with the Germany unification of 1871 and the 20-30 years after that.
One of the policy issues coming out of such analysis is whether the UK can potentially be the "Austria", ie left out of the unification.
Another issue is whether European unification of the depth of the 1871 German one, will lead to stringer or weaker large members of the EU, namely Germany and France. And of course for the United Europe as a whole, and all its components 25 or more or less of the current member of the EU27.
By European unification I mean not the current state of the EU but the potential political union, that would count of a unification analogous (to be compared AND contrasted) with the Germany unification of 1871 and the 20-30 years after that.
One of the policy issues coming out of such analysis is whether the UK can potentially be the "Austria", ie left out of the unification.
Another issue is whether European unification of the depth of the 1871 German one, will lead to stringer or weaker large members of the EU, namely Germany and France. And of course for the United Europe as a whole, and all its components 25 or more or less of the current member of the EU27.
Tuesday, April 17, 2012
To provide real leadership in the EU and EZ, Germany should ...
To provide real leadership in the EU and EZ, Germany must among other things:
1) Stop using, explicitly or implicitly, the "paymaster" argument. Why? See my post "The EU will not be a democracy until .."
2) It must adopt English (the world's lingua franca) as a second official language (see why in (3) and (4))
3) Become a European and to some extent global hub for ideas and debate thereof (take share away from UK & US). A hub where Germans and other Europeans and thinkers of all kinds (economic, political, sociologists, et al) can debate new ideas and challenge existing ones.
4) For that to happen, the German government must cease depending on ancient ideas and use the product, new ideas, of the European and global hub in Germany. In a way, it can learn from the Hellenistic Times, where the area formulated by Alexander the Great was a melting pot of ideas and traditions, not only from Ancient Greece but also from Egypt, Persia and other parts of the area. That is why they are called Hellenistic Times, they were a blend of Greek and the other ideas and traditions (see also my post "Globalisation, today and in 300 BC: Hellenism, Globalism and "Americanism"", April 20, 2008). In other words, some sort of "Germanistic Times" can become a periods of progress in European unification, as long as the rigid ideas of Merkel and her advisers as well as ordoliberalism etc are set aside in return for what the "hub" produces.
Comments?
(in English bite)
1) Stop using, explicitly or implicitly, the "paymaster" argument. Why? See my post "The EU will not be a democracy until .."
2) It must adopt English (the world's lingua franca) as a second official language (see why in (3) and (4))
3) Become a European and to some extent global hub for ideas and debate thereof (take share away from UK & US). A hub where Germans and other Europeans and thinkers of all kinds (economic, political, sociologists, et al) can debate new ideas and challenge existing ones.
4) For that to happen, the German government must cease depending on ancient ideas and use the product, new ideas, of the European and global hub in Germany. In a way, it can learn from the Hellenistic Times, where the area formulated by Alexander the Great was a melting pot of ideas and traditions, not only from Ancient Greece but also from Egypt, Persia and other parts of the area. That is why they are called Hellenistic Times, they were a blend of Greek and the other ideas and traditions (see also my post "Globalisation, today and in 300 BC: Hellenism, Globalism and "Americanism"", April 20, 2008). In other words, some sort of "Germanistic Times" can become a periods of progress in European unification, as long as the rigid ideas of Merkel and her advisers as well as ordoliberalism etc are set aside in return for what the "hub" produces.
Comments?
(in English bite)
Saturday, April 14, 2012
Prussia after German unification vs Germany after European unification
A historical comparison - contrast exercise:
Is Germany afraid re European (political) unification of the same/similar thing that happened to Prussia after a few decades of the German unification in the 1870s?
Addition (15/4/2012): In other words, will/can a (political) unification of Europe have )within a few decades) the same effect on Germany that the 1870s German unification had on Prussia?
Is Germany afraid re European (political) unification of the same/similar thing that happened to Prussia after a few decades of the German unification in the 1870s?
Addition (15/4/2012): In other words, will/can a (political) unification of Europe have )within a few decades) the same effect on Germany that the 1870s German unification had on Prussia?
Friday, April 13, 2012
From Remember Doha to Europe after May 6
Remember Doha (the Doha Round of WTO talks)? What happened to it?
Or even "Doha Lite"?
Some 6 years ago (December 2006), before the subprime led crisis, the Euro crisis, a few years after the dotcom crisis (bubble), and before the real estate bubbles in the US, Ireland and Spain (et al), before the global oil and staple foods prices crisis, I was proposing that: The "kingdom" of economic liberalism is not "grounded" that well on this earth! The ongoing troubles of the Doha Round of world trade talks are evidence to that. What do people prefer, to work as blacksmiths in a fair trade based job market or as knights in a free market based job market? (from my post "The Pirates of the Globalean and the curse of liberalism?", 4/12/2006).
The "rest of the wordl" compared to the US and the EU (and its (so they think) developed grand economies of the G7 (UK, Germany, France and Italy)) plus Japan and Canada, has been claiming its fair share on world GDP and wealth in general. That means (see rough calculations in my recent post, 3/2/2012: "If GDP per capita in USA, EU, China, India was to converge then ...") a decline in the US and EU's share of the world GDP and their GDPs per capita. Which is already happening and one can expect acceleration in the near future, unless:
As I have argued in many posts and tweets, the WTO "global trade league" does not seem to work for the US and the EU anymore since China entered (December 2001) and showed its communist-capitalist muscle. The troubles of the WTO talks in 2003 in Cancun prompted the EU, the US and others to sign bilateral trade (and sometimes wider "economic" or even wider) agreements. Also, it prompted the establishment of new or the evolution of existing "regional" entities (see eg ASEAN, ASEAN-China, Mercsur and UNASUR, even the African Union project) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) aka Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. Not to forget NAFTA and CAFTA. And the pan-American free trade area that Bush tried to promote but fell flat on its (his) face in Mar Del Plata at the 4th Summit of the Americas in November 2005. Which was by the way followed a month later, by another major fail of the WTO Doha Round of talks in the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, 13–18 December 2005.
Political science and politics have developed in recent centuries different models for the re-distribution of wealth inside national confines. Now they have to deal wit it at global level-framework, not national. No wonder many are fighting against a world government (with a world parliament) tooth and nail! Even at the European level, the Euro crisis is partly a crisis of redistribution of wealth at European level or even the mere development of "EU interest" or "Eurozone interest" instead of national interest!
No wonder that an oxymoronic anti-globalist (and even anti-EU) libertarian anti-tax, anti-state, austerity-hawkish political philosophy has evolved. How does one blend libertarianism with nationalism, well that is a political "bartender's" secret that still eludes me.
So, are the social democrats or the left of center more generally ready to govern in Europe? Yes, as long as it finds a political model for EU or Eurozone "interest". The same applies to the centrists in Europe (who are they? that is another post). The conservatives are torn between the German ordoliberal and the classic or neo liberal thinking dogmas (eg the UK Tories). Against a backdrop of the Belgian issue between Vlaanderen and Wallonie or the after-math of the German re-unification pains of the 1990s that still linger to some extent.
Are the German Pirates a view of things to come in European politics? Too early to tell.
What will happen in the Eurzone and the EU if Hollande breaks up the Merkozy affair on May 6? Well, on verra, but can it be worse than the existing situation (of Merkozian politics and economics)? Nein, non. ochi.
Or even "Doha Lite"?
Some 6 years ago (December 2006), before the subprime led crisis, the Euro crisis, a few years after the dotcom crisis (bubble), and before the real estate bubbles in the US, Ireland and Spain (et al), before the global oil and staple foods prices crisis, I was proposing that: The "kingdom" of economic liberalism is not "grounded" that well on this earth! The ongoing troubles of the Doha Round of world trade talks are evidence to that. What do people prefer, to work as blacksmiths in a fair trade based job market or as knights in a free market based job market? (from my post "The Pirates of the Globalean and the curse of liberalism?", 4/12/2006).
The "rest of the wordl" compared to the US and the EU (and its (so they think) developed grand economies of the G7 (UK, Germany, France and Italy)) plus Japan and Canada, has been claiming its fair share on world GDP and wealth in general. That means (see rough calculations in my recent post, 3/2/2012: "If GDP per capita in USA, EU, China, India was to converge then ...") a decline in the US and EU's share of the world GDP and their GDPs per capita. Which is already happening and one can expect acceleration in the near future, unless:
As I have argued in many posts and tweets, the WTO "global trade league" does not seem to work for the US and the EU anymore since China entered (December 2001) and showed its communist-capitalist muscle. The troubles of the WTO talks in 2003 in Cancun prompted the EU, the US and others to sign bilateral trade (and sometimes wider "economic" or even wider) agreements. Also, it prompted the establishment of new or the evolution of existing "regional" entities (see eg ASEAN, ASEAN-China, Mercsur and UNASUR, even the African Union project) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) aka Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. Not to forget NAFTA and CAFTA. And the pan-American free trade area that Bush tried to promote but fell flat on its (his) face in Mar Del Plata at the 4th Summit of the Americas in November 2005. Which was by the way followed a month later, by another major fail of the WTO Doha Round of talks in the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, 13–18 December 2005.
Political science and politics have developed in recent centuries different models for the re-distribution of wealth inside national confines. Now they have to deal wit it at global level-framework, not national. No wonder many are fighting against a world government (with a world parliament) tooth and nail! Even at the European level, the Euro crisis is partly a crisis of redistribution of wealth at European level or even the mere development of "EU interest" or "Eurozone interest" instead of national interest!
No wonder that an oxymoronic anti-globalist (and even anti-EU) libertarian anti-tax, anti-state, austerity-hawkish political philosophy has evolved. How does one blend libertarianism with nationalism, well that is a political "bartender's" secret that still eludes me.
So, are the social democrats or the left of center more generally ready to govern in Europe? Yes, as long as it finds a political model for EU or Eurozone "interest". The same applies to the centrists in Europe (who are they? that is another post). The conservatives are torn between the German ordoliberal and the classic or neo liberal thinking dogmas (eg the UK Tories). Against a backdrop of the Belgian issue between Vlaanderen and Wallonie or the after-math of the German re-unification pains of the 1990s that still linger to some extent.
Are the German Pirates a view of things to come in European politics? Too early to tell.
What will happen in the Eurzone and the EU if Hollande breaks up the Merkozy affair on May 6? Well, on verra, but can it be worse than the existing situation (of Merkozian politics and economics)? Nein, non. ochi.
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