Europe (EU) Day is on May 9 every year. But this year it seems that Europe (EU) day is May 6:
Why?
Because of the elections in France, Greece as well as Schleswig-Holstein; all there crucial not only for a national point of view but an EU (and Euroland) POV as well.
And if one takes account of the UK local elections, including London, of May 3, and other events of the week (see my European Calendar) then one could argue that this week Monday April 30th to May 6 is "Europe Week 2012".
PS. Of course, like other days, such a Valentine's Day, one could argue that in essence days like Europe (EU) Day are or they should be every day of the year!
PS2. Add to them the local elections in some 900 towns in Italy on Sunday and Monday.
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Saturday, May 5, 2012
Monday, April 30, 2012
Which is more important for Europe's anti-austerity dynamics?
Both are important factors, but which is more important for Europe's anti-austerity dynamcs?
a) Hoillande win on May 6
or
b) Obama re-election?
a) Hoillande win on May 6
or
b) Obama re-election?
Monday, April 23, 2012
The morning after April 22: EU27 politics: If, then, else!
Monday morning, after the first round of the French Presidential elections.
Does Le Pen showing decrease the probability of Hollande success in Round 2, on May 6? The polls I have read seem to suggest yes, but only by a little. But let's try an if, then, else exercise.
If Hollande wins the Presidency, then he will dispute the Fiscal Compact and the German social democrats (SPD), will have political impetus to decide whether to defeat the ratification of the Fiscal Compact by Germany (since 2/3rds are needed in both houses of the German federal parliament).
If Hollande loses on May 6, Sarkozy is re-elected, then the Merkozy pair remains (almost, see eg Sarkozy's pre-election views on immigration as opposed to the German - Merkel's stance on the subject) and it is strictly up to the SPD, still trailing the CDU/CSU in the polls, to decide whether to bring down the Fiscal Compact and face the positive and negative effects of such decision in the German political arena and public opinion, else negotiate some growth spending in return for voting for the Fiscal Compact.
Is the Dutch situation, the inability of austerity and Fiscal Compact most "hardcore" supporter next to Merkozy, the current Dutch government, to meet fiscal objectives this year and next, an ace in the hands of the German SPD or the socio-political forces in the EU that are against the super austerity of the Fiscal Compact? Could be, especially if there is a new election that yields a new government that includes the Dutch Labour party (and D66).
EU27 politics are complicated, huh? Imagine if the EU had 50 states as the US does. But the US has political union, the EU?
Does Le Pen showing decrease the probability of Hollande success in Round 2, on May 6? The polls I have read seem to suggest yes, but only by a little. But let's try an if, then, else exercise.
If Hollande wins the Presidency, then he will dispute the Fiscal Compact and the German social democrats (SPD), will have political impetus to decide whether to defeat the ratification of the Fiscal Compact by Germany (since 2/3rds are needed in both houses of the German federal parliament).
If Hollande loses on May 6, Sarkozy is re-elected, then the Merkozy pair remains (almost, see eg Sarkozy's pre-election views on immigration as opposed to the German - Merkel's stance on the subject) and it is strictly up to the SPD, still trailing the CDU/CSU in the polls, to decide whether to bring down the Fiscal Compact and face the positive and negative effects of such decision in the German political arena and public opinion, else negotiate some growth spending in return for voting for the Fiscal Compact.
Is the Dutch situation, the inability of austerity and Fiscal Compact most "hardcore" supporter next to Merkozy, the current Dutch government, to meet fiscal objectives this year and next, an ace in the hands of the German SPD or the socio-political forces in the EU that are against the super austerity of the Fiscal Compact? Could be, especially if there is a new election that yields a new government that includes the Dutch Labour party (and D66).
EU27 politics are complicated, huh? Imagine if the EU had 50 states as the US does. But the US has political union, the EU?
Sunday, April 22, 2012
Good houskeeping, the European social democratic way
Good "housekeeping" in the EU member states is always a must but Sarkozy, the current Dutch government, Merkel and others must be sacked for obsessing about it!
For setting targets that are too unrealistic, in terms of the actual numbers as well as the whole philosophy of setting strict targets and obsessing about reaching them. That is also a problem with inflation (the 2% "magic" target), even the targets of the Europe 2020 "growth Strategy". Economics, including fiscal and budgetary ones, are not like Physics or Chemistry, they are part of social sciences and as such they must be treated with a grain of salt. People are not robots, neither are their economic, social, political and policy actions.
Some politicians are willing to bend to the demands of financial markets.
Since many years ago I have written about the demands placed on listed companies by the financial market. The pressure to meet specific targets on a quarterly basis. And the negative impact that this has on the medium term performance of the corporation.
In recent years, the same pressure is being put on countries, their economies.
Time for that to stop! That should be one of the philosophies of the social democrats in the EU27.
Of course states, as companies do, need to improve their accounting procedures, know what they are spending and why (the why part is management accounting as opposed to financial accounting). To keep their finances solid but without "human sacrifices" of the obsession austerity kind. The preservation of the European Social Model and the need for the recognition of the positive role economic immigrants can play in the funding of the social model of an ageing EU27 (instead of scapegoating them).
To make a humanist EU the beacon for others in the world, since the American beacon has been dying out in recent decades (see also the resistance to not only HillaryCare of the Bill Clinton 1st term but also of Obamacare, especially the public option).
In a secular Europe, economic religions such as growth via austerity, classic, neo ir ordo liberalism and of course neo-Marxism have no place! Policy must provide solutions for real problems of real people.
For setting targets that are too unrealistic, in terms of the actual numbers as well as the whole philosophy of setting strict targets and obsessing about reaching them. That is also a problem with inflation (the 2% "magic" target), even the targets of the Europe 2020 "growth Strategy". Economics, including fiscal and budgetary ones, are not like Physics or Chemistry, they are part of social sciences and as such they must be treated with a grain of salt. People are not robots, neither are their economic, social, political and policy actions.
Some politicians are willing to bend to the demands of financial markets.
Since many years ago I have written about the demands placed on listed companies by the financial market. The pressure to meet specific targets on a quarterly basis. And the negative impact that this has on the medium term performance of the corporation.
In recent years, the same pressure is being put on countries, their economies.
Time for that to stop! That should be one of the philosophies of the social democrats in the EU27.
Of course states, as companies do, need to improve their accounting procedures, know what they are spending and why (the why part is management accounting as opposed to financial accounting). To keep their finances solid but without "human sacrifices" of the obsession austerity kind. The preservation of the European Social Model and the need for the recognition of the positive role economic immigrants can play in the funding of the social model of an ageing EU27 (instead of scapegoating them).
To make a humanist EU the beacon for others in the world, since the American beacon has been dying out in recent decades (see also the resistance to not only HillaryCare of the Bill Clinton 1st term but also of Obamacare, especially the public option).
In a secular Europe, economic religions such as growth via austerity, classic, neo ir ordo liberalism and of course neo-Marxism have no place! Policy must provide solutions for real problems of real people.
Friday, April 13, 2012
From Remember Doha to Europe after May 6
Remember Doha (the Doha Round of WTO talks)? What happened to it?
Or even "Doha Lite"?
Some 6 years ago (December 2006), before the subprime led crisis, the Euro crisis, a few years after the dotcom crisis (bubble), and before the real estate bubbles in the US, Ireland and Spain (et al), before the global oil and staple foods prices crisis, I was proposing that: The "kingdom" of economic liberalism is not "grounded" that well on this earth! The ongoing troubles of the Doha Round of world trade talks are evidence to that. What do people prefer, to work as blacksmiths in a fair trade based job market or as knights in a free market based job market? (from my post "The Pirates of the Globalean and the curse of liberalism?", 4/12/2006).
The "rest of the wordl" compared to the US and the EU (and its (so they think) developed grand economies of the G7 (UK, Germany, France and Italy)) plus Japan and Canada, has been claiming its fair share on world GDP and wealth in general. That means (see rough calculations in my recent post, 3/2/2012: "If GDP per capita in USA, EU, China, India was to converge then ...") a decline in the US and EU's share of the world GDP and their GDPs per capita. Which is already happening and one can expect acceleration in the near future, unless:
As I have argued in many posts and tweets, the WTO "global trade league" does not seem to work for the US and the EU anymore since China entered (December 2001) and showed its communist-capitalist muscle. The troubles of the WTO talks in 2003 in Cancun prompted the EU, the US and others to sign bilateral trade (and sometimes wider "economic" or even wider) agreements. Also, it prompted the establishment of new or the evolution of existing "regional" entities (see eg ASEAN, ASEAN-China, Mercsur and UNASUR, even the African Union project) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) aka Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. Not to forget NAFTA and CAFTA. And the pan-American free trade area that Bush tried to promote but fell flat on its (his) face in Mar Del Plata at the 4th Summit of the Americas in November 2005. Which was by the way followed a month later, by another major fail of the WTO Doha Round of talks in the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, 13–18 December 2005.
Political science and politics have developed in recent centuries different models for the re-distribution of wealth inside national confines. Now they have to deal wit it at global level-framework, not national. No wonder many are fighting against a world government (with a world parliament) tooth and nail! Even at the European level, the Euro crisis is partly a crisis of redistribution of wealth at European level or even the mere development of "EU interest" or "Eurozone interest" instead of national interest!
No wonder that an oxymoronic anti-globalist (and even anti-EU) libertarian anti-tax, anti-state, austerity-hawkish political philosophy has evolved. How does one blend libertarianism with nationalism, well that is a political "bartender's" secret that still eludes me.
So, are the social democrats or the left of center more generally ready to govern in Europe? Yes, as long as it finds a political model for EU or Eurozone "interest". The same applies to the centrists in Europe (who are they? that is another post). The conservatives are torn between the German ordoliberal and the classic or neo liberal thinking dogmas (eg the UK Tories). Against a backdrop of the Belgian issue between Vlaanderen and Wallonie or the after-math of the German re-unification pains of the 1990s that still linger to some extent.
Are the German Pirates a view of things to come in European politics? Too early to tell.
What will happen in the Eurzone and the EU if Hollande breaks up the Merkozy affair on May 6? Well, on verra, but can it be worse than the existing situation (of Merkozian politics and economics)? Nein, non. ochi.
Or even "Doha Lite"?
Some 6 years ago (December 2006), before the subprime led crisis, the Euro crisis, a few years after the dotcom crisis (bubble), and before the real estate bubbles in the US, Ireland and Spain (et al), before the global oil and staple foods prices crisis, I was proposing that: The "kingdom" of economic liberalism is not "grounded" that well on this earth! The ongoing troubles of the Doha Round of world trade talks are evidence to that. What do people prefer, to work as blacksmiths in a fair trade based job market or as knights in a free market based job market? (from my post "The Pirates of the Globalean and the curse of liberalism?", 4/12/2006).
The "rest of the wordl" compared to the US and the EU (and its (so they think) developed grand economies of the G7 (UK, Germany, France and Italy)) plus Japan and Canada, has been claiming its fair share on world GDP and wealth in general. That means (see rough calculations in my recent post, 3/2/2012: "If GDP per capita in USA, EU, China, India was to converge then ...") a decline in the US and EU's share of the world GDP and their GDPs per capita. Which is already happening and one can expect acceleration in the near future, unless:
As I have argued in many posts and tweets, the WTO "global trade league" does not seem to work for the US and the EU anymore since China entered (December 2001) and showed its communist-capitalist muscle. The troubles of the WTO talks in 2003 in Cancun prompted the EU, the US and others to sign bilateral trade (and sometimes wider "economic" or even wider) agreements. Also, it prompted the establishment of new or the evolution of existing "regional" entities (see eg ASEAN, ASEAN-China, Mercsur and UNASUR, even the African Union project) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) aka Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. Not to forget NAFTA and CAFTA. And the pan-American free trade area that Bush tried to promote but fell flat on its (his) face in Mar Del Plata at the 4th Summit of the Americas in November 2005. Which was by the way followed a month later, by another major fail of the WTO Doha Round of talks in the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, 13–18 December 2005.
Political science and politics have developed in recent centuries different models for the re-distribution of wealth inside national confines. Now they have to deal wit it at global level-framework, not national. No wonder many are fighting against a world government (with a world parliament) tooth and nail! Even at the European level, the Euro crisis is partly a crisis of redistribution of wealth at European level or even the mere development of "EU interest" or "Eurozone interest" instead of national interest!
No wonder that an oxymoronic anti-globalist (and even anti-EU) libertarian anti-tax, anti-state, austerity-hawkish political philosophy has evolved. How does one blend libertarianism with nationalism, well that is a political "bartender's" secret that still eludes me.
So, are the social democrats or the left of center more generally ready to govern in Europe? Yes, as long as it finds a political model for EU or Eurozone "interest". The same applies to the centrists in Europe (who are they? that is another post). The conservatives are torn between the German ordoliberal and the classic or neo liberal thinking dogmas (eg the UK Tories). Against a backdrop of the Belgian issue between Vlaanderen and Wallonie or the after-math of the German re-unification pains of the 1990s that still linger to some extent.
Are the German Pirates a view of things to come in European politics? Too early to tell.
What will happen in the Eurzone and the EU if Hollande breaks up the Merkozy affair on May 6? Well, on verra, but can it be worse than the existing situation (of Merkozian politics and economics)? Nein, non. ochi.
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
From Merkozy to Merkollande to Merkoron: Merkel diversifying?
I read most (link) and watched some (link) of Angela Merkel's interview to the BBC tonight (Monday, March 26) to Gavin Esler in BBC 2's well know program Newsnight. I had also read Gavin Esler's article "Germans can't escape their Lutheran past", posted on BBC News Online a few hours before the airing of the Merkel interview.
My comments:
It seems to me that Angela Merkel is trying to diversify, especially in anticipation of the May 6 election in France (and the potential political loss of the "Merkozy" partner Nicolas Sarkozy) as well as the fact that she will have to get support from SDP, the German social-democrats, if she is to have her Fiscal Compact ratified by the German parliament and upper house.
To that effect:
1) She appears more humanistic (but not too, she also Mr. Elser's article "Germans can't escape their Lutheran past" ) re Greece and the PIIGS
2) She opens up more bridges with the UK, stressing the things they have in common (Germany-UK and/or Merkel-Cameron). Maybe a potential Merkel-Cameron "wild card" at hand should things turn out really sour in the Eurozone and the Fiscal Compact?
Germany and the UK, or at least the conservative parties, do indeed have a similar POV in international trade matters, although Germany is an export superpower, UK is not), one has to factor in Germany's most recent reactions to Barroso's plans for a more aggressive trade management policy for the EU.
Which makes me think again and write again how relevant Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is in EU Affairs nowadays.
PS. Now casual were the comparisions between Thatcher and Merkel? A pity Hillary Clinton is not conservative or pro-austerity too!
My comments:
It seems to me that Angela Merkel is trying to diversify, especially in anticipation of the May 6 election in France (and the potential political loss of the "Merkozy" partner Nicolas Sarkozy) as well as the fact that she will have to get support from SDP, the German social-democrats, if she is to have her Fiscal Compact ratified by the German parliament and upper house.
To that effect:
1) She appears more humanistic (but not too, she also Mr. Elser's article "Germans can't escape their Lutheran past" ) re Greece and the PIIGS
2) She opens up more bridges with the UK, stressing the things they have in common (Germany-UK and/or Merkel-Cameron). Maybe a potential Merkel-Cameron "wild card" at hand should things turn out really sour in the Eurozone and the Fiscal Compact?
Germany and the UK, or at least the conservative parties, do indeed have a similar POV in international trade matters, although Germany is an export superpower, UK is not), one has to factor in Germany's most recent reactions to Barroso's plans for a more aggressive trade management policy for the EU.
Which makes me think again and write again how relevant Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is in EU Affairs nowadays.
PS. Now casual were the comparisions between Thatcher and Merkel? A pity Hillary Clinton is not conservative or pro-austerity too!
Saturday, March 10, 2012
The potential for an alternative to the Merkozy way (Part1)
The need for a 2/3 majority in both houses of the German parliament which became known last Saturday and the potential power it gives to the SPD and the Greens, have altered the potential for an alternative to the Merkozy way. In a more positive way that before.
Before, a win by Francois Hollande on May 6 in France, would be the beginning of a comeback of the progressive political and social forces in the EU, the Eurozone and the Europlus.
Since the need for 2/3 majority to adopt the Fiscal Compact has arisen, there is potential for more than that. Today, Saturday (March 10) Reuters reports: German SPD wants concessions for backing fiscal pact
One of the questions that arise is: Is the SPD waiting for the May 6 result in France to determine its exact stance on the Fiscal Compact?
Why?
Well, according to The Guardian's "Left, right, left: how political shifts have altered the map of Europe" graph, on March 10, only 5 governments or government coalitions in the EU are characterised as "left wing", 2 (Greece and Italy) as "neutral" and the rest, ie 20 as "right wing".
Those 5 are: Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Slovenia and Cyprus,
The Slovak elections today seems that it will add one more to the 5.
Thus of the 25 that have signed the Fiscal Compact, 17 are conservatives, 2 technocratic and 6 progressive.
Among the Eurozone 17, the split is 10, 2, 5.
So at this time, is there enough potential for a change of political momentum, against the Merkozy way and in favour of a more "balanced" and less austerity-obsessed way?
Well, among the 25, the split is heavily in favour of the conservatives, 17-6, thus a rejection of the Fiscal Compact in Germany would provide major political embarrassment for Merkel, kill the plan but not pave the way for an alternative plan.
Yet on May 7, if France "goes Socialist" ob May 6, and with the problems already in Spain and potentially in The Netherlands, there may be enough momentum for a radical amendment to the Fiscal Compact, more radical than today. Maybe a new Pact altogether, with less hardcore fiscal austerity and much more keynesian.
Now, if Sarkozy emerges victorious on May 6, austerity and fiscal compact will have won a major battle. The SPD and Greens will still be able to get some offsets for adopting the compact but the compact will go through, since even an Irish No in theory does not prevent a majority of the members to adopt the compact. Of course those who turn it down, will not have access to bail outs etc.
Complicated, huh? Not a dull moment in EU Affairs!
Before, a win by Francois Hollande on May 6 in France, would be the beginning of a comeback of the progressive political and social forces in the EU, the Eurozone and the Europlus.
Since the need for 2/3 majority to adopt the Fiscal Compact has arisen, there is potential for more than that. Today, Saturday (March 10) Reuters reports: German SPD wants concessions for backing fiscal pact
One of the questions that arise is: Is the SPD waiting for the May 6 result in France to determine its exact stance on the Fiscal Compact?
Why?
Well, according to The Guardian's "Left, right, left: how political shifts have altered the map of Europe" graph, on March 10, only 5 governments or government coalitions in the EU are characterised as "left wing", 2 (Greece and Italy) as "neutral" and the rest, ie 20 as "right wing".
Those 5 are: Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Slovenia and Cyprus,
The Slovak elections today seems that it will add one more to the 5.
Thus of the 25 that have signed the Fiscal Compact, 17 are conservatives, 2 technocratic and 6 progressive.
Among the Eurozone 17, the split is 10, 2, 5.
So at this time, is there enough potential for a change of political momentum, against the Merkozy way and in favour of a more "balanced" and less austerity-obsessed way?
Well, among the 25, the split is heavily in favour of the conservatives, 17-6, thus a rejection of the Fiscal Compact in Germany would provide major political embarrassment for Merkel, kill the plan but not pave the way for an alternative plan.
Yet on May 7, if France "goes Socialist" ob May 6, and with the problems already in Spain and potentially in The Netherlands, there may be enough momentum for a radical amendment to the Fiscal Compact, more radical than today. Maybe a new Pact altogether, with less hardcore fiscal austerity and much more keynesian.
Now, if Sarkozy emerges victorious on May 6, austerity and fiscal compact will have won a major battle. The SPD and Greens will still be able to get some offsets for adopting the compact but the compact will go through, since even an Irish No in theory does not prevent a majority of the members to adopt the compact. Of course those who turn it down, will not have access to bail outs etc.
Complicated, huh? Not a dull moment in EU Affairs!
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
Who will raise the progressive flag in the European political battlefield? Hollande or SPD - Greens?
Will Hollande or SPD - Greens put an end to the neocons (Merkoz et al) destruction of Europe?
1) 2011 was politically a very good year for European conservatives, EPP or other. With the exception of Denmark, all the national elections of 2011 brought conservative EPP member parties to power!
At present only 4 EU (3 Eurozone) member states are not governed by conservative governments or technocrats (the cases of Italy and Greece): Cyprus, Austria (a grand coalition but with a social democrat PM), Slovenia and Denmark.
Hardcore austerity has been a key element of the conservative domination of EU and Eurozone politics.
Until Saturday, the French Presidential election in France and the potential election of Francois Hollande was where the Eurozone's "battle for Middle Earth" was going to be "fought". The next day of the second round, May 7, could be the one that marked a new tide in Europe, a progressive one!
2) But the Art 23 issue in Germany (see my previous post: "Merkel's fiscal compact evokes article 23 of the German constitution: a) An own goal by Merkel or b) A clever plot?") offers SPD and Greens the chance to reverse the tide, bfore Hollande. By rejecting the fiscal compact!
Will they do it or prove they are "Ordoliberal" too as Ulrike Guérot and Sebastian Dullien seem to suggest in their article "Why Berlin is fixed on a German solution to the eurozone crisis" in The Guardian last Friday?
In other words the Art 23 issue forces the SPD and Greens to take a stand. Are they part a) of the conservative or b) the progressive Europe?
The progressive social and political forces of Europe are looking at SPD and the Greens and wondering. Are they ready to raise the flag of progressive politics in Germany and the Euroaone and EU by rejecting Merkozy's Fiscal Compact in the votes in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat or will they contain themselves with minor growth trade offs and wait for Hollande to make the difference?
1) 2011 was politically a very good year for European conservatives, EPP or other. With the exception of Denmark, all the national elections of 2011 brought conservative EPP member parties to power!
At present only 4 EU (3 Eurozone) member states are not governed by conservative governments or technocrats (the cases of Italy and Greece): Cyprus, Austria (a grand coalition but with a social democrat PM), Slovenia and Denmark.
Hardcore austerity has been a key element of the conservative domination of EU and Eurozone politics.
Until Saturday, the French Presidential election in France and the potential election of Francois Hollande was where the Eurozone's "battle for Middle Earth" was going to be "fought". The next day of the second round, May 7, could be the one that marked a new tide in Europe, a progressive one!
2) But the Art 23 issue in Germany (see my previous post: "Merkel's fiscal compact evokes article 23 of the German constitution: a) An own goal by Merkel or b) A clever plot?") offers SPD and Greens the chance to reverse the tide, bfore Hollande. By rejecting the fiscal compact!
Will they do it or prove they are "Ordoliberal" too as Ulrike Guérot and Sebastian Dullien seem to suggest in their article "Why Berlin is fixed on a German solution to the eurozone crisis" in The Guardian last Friday?
In other words the Art 23 issue forces the SPD and Greens to take a stand. Are they part a) of the conservative or b) the progressive Europe?
The progressive social and political forces of Europe are looking at SPD and the Greens and wondering. Are they ready to raise the flag of progressive politics in Germany and the Euroaone and EU by rejecting Merkozy's Fiscal Compact in the votes in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat or will they contain themselves with minor growth trade offs and wait for Hollande to make the difference?
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
EU and Eurozone systemics: The mother of all crises is
EU & Eurozone: The mother of all crises is:
The perennial grandstanding by UK, France, Germany in the EU & of the latter two (Germany and France) in the Eurozone.
The perennial grandstanding by UK, France, Germany in the EU & of the latter two (Germany and France) in the Eurozone.
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
What are the high Industrial Producer Prices in April (EU, Eurozone) a sign of?
This is a follow up to my post of May 4: "Updated! Industrial Producer prices hikes among Eurozone members: Cause for concerns"
According to Eurostat (June 6)
April 2011 Industrial producer prices when compared with March 2011 are up by 0.9% in Eurozone and up by 1.0% in EU27.
But the worrying picture becomes more clear when one looks at the April 2011 figures compared with 1 year ago, ie April 2010:
In April 2011 compared with April 2010, industrial producer prices gained 6.7% in Eurozone and 7.8% in the EU!
Eurozone (April 2011 compared with April 2010):
Total industry excluding construction +6.7%
Total industry excluding construction and energy +4.4%
Intermediate goods +7.3%
Energy +13.3% (yes 13.3%!!!!)
Capital goods +1.3%
Durable consumer goods +2.0%
Non-durable consumer goods +3.4%
Industrial producer (or wholesale) prices are a sign of upcoming inflation (consume price index) trends (a few months later).
Let's look at the figures for some EU member states (April 2011 compared with April 2010):
No 1 (highest in the EU): UK +13.1% in April, vs +8.1% in December 2010 (compared with Dec 2009) and only +5.1% in November 2010 (compared with November 2009).
No 2 (and No 1 in the Eurozone): NL +11.7
No 3: Bulgaria +10.7%
No 4 (and No 2 in the Eurozone): Belgium +10.6%
No 5: Lithuania +10.5%
No 6: Denmark +9.9%
No 7: Poland and Latvia with 9.4%
No 9: Romania +8.8%
No 10 (and No 3 in the Eurozone): Finland +8.5%
Germany's and France's are both +6.4%! How about that!
See full Eurostat figures by country
Note that the Eurozone17 average in 110 basis points below the EU27 average!
Whereas international energy (oil) prices and the prices of some staple foods are said to be pushning industrial production costs up (and thus leading to higher wholesale prices) these high numbers seem to indicate that industries in the EU and the Eurozone seem to think that they can afford to pass these prices on down to the intermediaries and the final consumer (whether consumers (b2c) or other companies (b2b). Of course, some of the sales will be made inside the EU some outside.
But with the Euro being at a relatively high price vis-avis the USD, the Yuan etc, one wonders what makes those industries think they can afford not to absorb more of the extra costs of the ebergy and other inputs.
a) Are their products that unique, in the EU, EUrozone and global markets?
b) Is competition not working well in certain sectors and/or member states or the EU Single Market?
or
c) Are they merely desperate (cannot internalise more of the extra input costs, pass them on and prey)?
I have no clue as to whether it is one of the above or something else. But I am wondering.
But I cannot help wonder, more generally, whether the way to best curb inflation in the Eurozone that the ECB is gung-ho for (2% target) is via "tightening" (ie raising interest rates) or by removing barriers to more competition intra-EZ or intra-EU or both! Any views?
According to Eurostat (June 6)
April 2011 Industrial producer prices when compared with March 2011 are up by 0.9% in Eurozone and up by 1.0% in EU27.
But the worrying picture becomes more clear when one looks at the April 2011 figures compared with 1 year ago, ie April 2010:
In April 2011 compared with April 2010, industrial producer prices gained 6.7% in Eurozone and 7.8% in the EU!
Eurozone (April 2011 compared with April 2010):
Total industry excluding construction +6.7%
Total industry excluding construction and energy +4.4%
Intermediate goods +7.3%
Energy +13.3% (yes 13.3%!!!!)
Capital goods +1.3%
Durable consumer goods +2.0%
Non-durable consumer goods +3.4%
Industrial producer (or wholesale) prices are a sign of upcoming inflation (consume price index) trends (a few months later).
Let's look at the figures for some EU member states (April 2011 compared with April 2010):
No 1 (highest in the EU): UK +13.1% in April, vs +8.1% in December 2010 (compared with Dec 2009) and only +5.1% in November 2010 (compared with November 2009).
No 2 (and No 1 in the Eurozone): NL +11.7
No 3: Bulgaria +10.7%
No 4 (and No 2 in the Eurozone): Belgium +10.6%
No 5: Lithuania +10.5%
No 6: Denmark +9.9%
No 7: Poland and Latvia with 9.4%
No 9: Romania +8.8%
No 10 (and No 3 in the Eurozone): Finland +8.5%
Germany's and France's are both +6.4%! How about that!
See full Eurostat figures by country
Note that the Eurozone17 average in 110 basis points below the EU27 average!
Whereas international energy (oil) prices and the prices of some staple foods are said to be pushning industrial production costs up (and thus leading to higher wholesale prices) these high numbers seem to indicate that industries in the EU and the Eurozone seem to think that they can afford to pass these prices on down to the intermediaries and the final consumer (whether consumers (b2c) or other companies (b2b). Of course, some of the sales will be made inside the EU some outside.
But with the Euro being at a relatively high price vis-avis the USD, the Yuan etc, one wonders what makes those industries think they can afford not to absorb more of the extra costs of the ebergy and other inputs.
a) Are their products that unique, in the EU, EUrozone and global markets?
b) Is competition not working well in certain sectors and/or member states or the EU Single Market?
or
c) Are they merely desperate (cannot internalise more of the extra input costs, pass them on and prey)?
I have no clue as to whether it is one of the above or something else. But I am wondering.
But I cannot help wonder, more generally, whether the way to best curb inflation in the Eurozone that the ECB is gung-ho for (2% target) is via "tightening" (ie raising interest rates) or by removing barriers to more competition intra-EZ or intra-EU or both! Any views?
Thursday, May 26, 2011
What are France, the UK, Germany and Italy doing in the G8?
This is one of the follow up posts to yesterday's post Key factors of "strength" in "post Doha" (and post WTO?) world systemics and on the occasion of the G8 meeting in Deauville (France), today and tomorrow.
The G8 started as G6 in the 1970s with France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the United States ie 4 large and "rich" (GDPwise) European countries members of the then EEC plus USA and Japan (also large and rich, see yesterday's post). Canada was invited later, and later Russia.
The EU is an extra, "associate" type of, participant.
My observations and points:
1) With G20 now in existence, what is G8 for?
2) Since the EEC is EU (since the 1990s) what is the point/sense of having France, Germany, Italy and the UK?
3) Considering Canada's population size compared to the other 7, why is it there (plus China and Brazil are in 2010 GDP terms richer than Canada)
4) Why is China (No. 1 in population and No. 2 in GDP) not there?
5) India is marginally less rich than Canada and Russia (1.4 vs 1.6 and 1.6 trillion USD 2010 see yesterday's article).
Hence, and depending of the weigt attached to GDP and population, the G8 should be:
either
A) G4: EU, USA, China and Japan
or
B) G7: EU, USA, China, Japan, India, Russia; plus Brazil (or the UNASUR).
The current G8 seems so 20th century and so globally irrelevant to 2011!
And in any case, EU members states have no place there, the EU does.
See also: Key factors of "strength" in "post Doha" (and post WTO?) world systemics
The G8 started as G6 in the 1970s with France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the United States ie 4 large and "rich" (GDPwise) European countries members of the then EEC plus USA and Japan (also large and rich, see yesterday's post). Canada was invited later, and later Russia.
The EU is an extra, "associate" type of, participant.
My observations and points:
1) With G20 now in existence, what is G8 for?
2) Since the EEC is EU (since the 1990s) what is the point/sense of having France, Germany, Italy and the UK?
3) Considering Canada's population size compared to the other 7, why is it there (plus China and Brazil are in 2010 GDP terms richer than Canada)
4) Why is China (No. 1 in population and No. 2 in GDP) not there?
5) India is marginally less rich than Canada and Russia (1.4 vs 1.6 and 1.6 trillion USD 2010 see yesterday's article).
Hence, and depending of the weigt attached to GDP and population, the G8 should be:
either
A) G4: EU, USA, China and Japan
or
B) G7: EU, USA, China, Japan, India, Russia; plus Brazil (or the UNASUR).
The current G8 seems so 20th century and so globally irrelevant to 2011!
And in any case, EU members states have no place there, the EU does.
See also: Key factors of "strength" in "post Doha" (and post WTO?) world systemics
Friday, March 4, 2011
Pact, reform, meetings, IP, jazz and inflation hawks
1) Some 36 hours before the EPP and Socialists' meetings in Helsinki and Athens to discuss the Merkel-Sarkozy competitiveness pact, a very important opinion article by Guy Verhofstadt, Jacques Delors & Romano Prodi re the pact appeared in the FT: Europe must plan a reform not a pact
4) The jazz (hype) re innovation reminds me of the jazz re HR (Human Resources & Human Capital etc) before the current crisis. All was forgotten when the crisis arrived!
So why this monolithic fear/phobia of inflation? For a long time now ECB interest rate is 1%, UK 0.5%, US 0.0-0.25%! So policy-wise, if the EU has higher propensity than UK & US for inflation consider that maybe that is because of its incomplete single market & union! Who realises that the EU;s micros & SMEs (and people) need EU-wide single laws in everything for the EU to work and provide jobs?
One of the things that the Delors, Prodi & Verhofstad article misses IMO is that if European Commission is involved that means also UK & Czech Rep, ie won't lead to the type of breakthrough needed. But they are right that a pact is not enough!
In a relevant communique, ALDE stresses that Europe needs a Community Act for economic convergence & governance
IMO, and for political union! EMU of 17 or 27 cannot work w/o real single market & real federal budget - income tax! It's now or ....!
2) According to The National, the UAE and Qatar are to help out Spain
3) According to the CBI: UK IP is fundamental to growth.
IMO, Intellectual Property is the capital of the 21st century (as opposed to land & financial equity/bonds etc) but how does one defend it? Via ACTA??
5) According to France24 (EN) The French lament their shrinking role on world stage
C'est la vie? IMO only EU can play such a role anymore, not France, neither the UK or any other EU country on its own.
C'est la vie? IMO only EU can play such a role anymore, not France, neither the UK or any other EU country on its own.
6) BBC News reports that the ECB said that Eurozone interest rates could rise in April
The inflation hawks are out! Oh my! Are some in the Eurozone trigger-happy re anti-inflationary measures (ie raising interest rates)? Can the Eurozone afford anti-inflation mania?
The inflation hawks are out! Oh my! Are some in the Eurozone trigger-happy re anti-inflationary measures (ie raising interest rates)? Can the Eurozone afford anti-inflation mania?
If the ECB interest rate goes up next time (because of inflation-phobia?) what will be the effect on financing cost & access of SMEs & the GIIPS (PIIGS)? What is the effect on Eurozone firms' ability to a) export b) defend their markets since the Euro will rise vs USD, Yuan, Pound etc? Effect on jobs in the Eurozone?
Saturday, February 13, 2010
Q4 09 GDP data for EU, Eurozone, Germany, etc
According to Flash estimates for the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2009 released by Eurostat on February 12, GDP in the EU grew by 0.1%, the same in the Eurozone (+0.1%) compared to the previous quarter. That means a slowding down of the growth rates compared in Q4 compared to Q3 of 2009, when rates were +0.3% in the EU and +0.4% in the Eurozone.
Compared to the Q4 of 2008, Q4 09 GDP in the Eurozone was -2.1% and in the EU -2.3%, which is an improvement over Q3 0f 09.
So while EU and its Eurozone grew 0.1%, the US economy grew 1.4% compared with the previous quarter.
Over the whole year in 2009, Eurozone GDP fell by 4.0% and EU GDP fell by 4.1%.
According to the same Eurostat release in the Q4 compared to Q3 the GDP rate was:
Germany 0%
France +0.6%
UK 0.1%
Spain -0.1%
Italy -0.2%
Compared to Q4 of 2008:
Germany -2.4%
UK -3.2%
France -0.3%
Italy -2.8%
Spain -3.1%
Compared to the Q4 of 2008, Q4 09 GDP in the Eurozone was -2.1% and in the EU -2.3%, which is an improvement over Q3 0f 09.
So while EU and its Eurozone grew 0.1%, the US economy grew 1.4% compared with the previous quarter.
Over the whole year in 2009, Eurozone GDP fell by 4.0% and EU GDP fell by 4.1%.
According to the same Eurostat release in the Q4 compared to Q3 the GDP rate was:
Germany 0%
France +0.6%
UK 0.1%
Spain -0.1%
Italy -0.2%
Compared to Q4 of 2008:
Germany -2.4%
UK -3.2%
France -0.3%
Italy -2.8%
Spain -3.1%
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
Echoes of the constitutional rejection of the French carbon tax
The French Constitutional Council's decision regarding the French carbon tax that was going to enter into force Jan 1 now forces the French government to introduce new carbon tax bill on Jan 20.
The decision is not against a carbon tax. It points out the inconsistencies and selective targeting and rejects the rationale for most exemptions to the tax. Also argued that inequalities re the tax existed in the law. It particularly pointed out, inter alia, that the emissions of 1018 most polluting sites were exempt from the tax (refineries, cement companies, etc), the emissions of air transportation plus those of public passenger transportation.
IMO, the French Constitutional Council's carbon tax decision serve as a reminder to policy - law makers everywhere that policies (no matter what policy area), laws and taxes have to have consistency and "regulatory quality".
The decision is not against a carbon tax. It points out the inconsistencies and selective targeting and rejects the rationale for most exemptions to the tax. Also argued that inequalities re the tax existed in the law. It particularly pointed out, inter alia, that the emissions of 1018 most polluting sites were exempt from the tax (refineries, cement companies, etc), the emissions of air transportation plus those of public passenger transportation.
IMO, the French Constitutional Council's carbon tax decision serve as a reminder to policy - law makers everywhere that policies (no matter what policy area), laws and taxes have to have consistency and "regulatory quality".
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Out of recession since Q2 2009!
What did Japan, Hong Kong, France and Germany have in common in Q2 of 2009?
Their GDP growth got them out of recession!
Their GDP growth got them out of recession!
Saturday, August 15, 2009
France and Germany out of recession in Q2 0f 2009?
-.0.1 Eurozone + 0.3 Germany + 0.3 France - 0.8 UK = ??
Friday, August 7, 2009
German and French trade balances in June
1) Germany
In June, exports rose by 7%, which is the fastest pace of growth in almost three years.
Exports were 67.4bn euros, imports 56.4bn euros, leading to a trade surplus of 11bn euros.
2) France
Exports fell to 27.44bn euros in June from 27.908bn euros in May, imports rose to 31.449bn euros in June from 31.045bn in May, thus the trade deficit grew to 4bn euros in June from 3.137bn euros in May.
In June, exports rose by 7%, which is the fastest pace of growth in almost three years.
Exports were 67.4bn euros, imports 56.4bn euros, leading to a trade surplus of 11bn euros.
2) France
Exports fell to 27.44bn euros in June from 27.908bn euros in May, imports rose to 31.449bn euros in June from 31.045bn in May, thus the trade deficit grew to 4bn euros in June from 3.137bn euros in May.
Friday, May 15, 2009
Q1 2009 GDP in Germany, France, Spain
The GDP stats for the first quarter of 2009 (Q1/2009) are in for Germany, France as well as Spain.
a) France. The fall/shrinking of the GDP was 1.2% (which is in line with expectations) compared to the previous quarter. Since in Q4/2008 the stat was -1.5%, this has given rise to views that the recession in France "may" be easing. No comment! By the way, the French Economy Ministry expects the French economy to contract by 3% in 2009.
b) Germany: Driven by lagging exports and investment, the GDP drop in Q1/2009 was a record 3.8% (!!), ie the worst GDP performance since re-unification (compared to the previous quarter), yielding a year-on-year drop of 6.7%, against a 6% prediction for the whole year 2009 made by the German government! The Q4/2008 drop, 2.2%, was the previous record low until the stats for Q1/2009 came in!
Is Germany (along with other traditional exports - trade surplus world "champions" economies) paying a price for their over-reliance on exports?
c) Spain: In Q1/2009. GDP fell 1.8% compared to Q4/2008 and shrank 2.9% on a year-on-year basis, based on preliminary data, making this the worst GDP performance since 1959! The Spanish government has predicted a GDP drop of 1.6% for 2009
Spain, which joined the EEC/EU in 1986, enjoyed 14 years of consecutive growth until it entered into recession Q4/2008. It seems that many experts think that Spain has major "economic imbalances" and that this will delay its rebounding. It also seems that the construction industry's major perils are a core driver of the Spanish economic recession.
a) France. The fall/shrinking of the GDP was 1.2% (which is in line with expectations) compared to the previous quarter. Since in Q4/2008 the stat was -1.5%, this has given rise to views that the recession in France "may" be easing. No comment! By the way, the French Economy Ministry expects the French economy to contract by 3% in 2009.
b) Germany: Driven by lagging exports and investment, the GDP drop in Q1/2009 was a record 3.8% (!!), ie the worst GDP performance since re-unification (compared to the previous quarter), yielding a year-on-year drop of 6.7%, against a 6% prediction for the whole year 2009 made by the German government! The Q4/2008 drop, 2.2%, was the previous record low until the stats for Q1/2009 came in!
Is Germany (along with other traditional exports - trade surplus world "champions" economies) paying a price for their over-reliance on exports?
c) Spain: In Q1/2009. GDP fell 1.8% compared to Q4/2008 and shrank 2.9% on a year-on-year basis, based on preliminary data, making this the worst GDP performance since 1959! The Spanish government has predicted a GDP drop of 1.6% for 2009
Spain, which joined the EEC/EU in 1986, enjoyed 14 years of consecutive growth until it entered into recession Q4/2008. It seems that many experts think that Spain has major "economic imbalances" and that this will delay its rebounding. It also seems that the construction industry's major perils are a core driver of the Spanish economic recession.
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